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CHAPTER 22 
MORAL DAMAGES  
IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Eric Bergsten has been one of the leading personalities in international trade and 
arbitration during the last decades. His tremendous influence on the 
harmonisation and unification in this field can hardly be overestimated. It is an 
honour to contribute this article to the celebrations of his eightieth birthday. The 
article tries to bridge gaps between international commercial arbitration and 
investment arbitration. 
2. THE BACKGROUND 
In recent years there has been a steady increase of investment arbitrations, some 
of which have discussed the recovery of moral damages. The factual situations in 
these cases often differ considerably from the typical commercial arbitration 
setting. In commercial arbitration the typical scenario is just a simple breach of 
contract leading to typical commercial loss, be it because of damage to property 
or loss of profit, sometimes coupled with loss of reputation. In contrast, the facts 
underlying the cases concerning moral damages in investment arbitration are 
quite drastic. In particular, expropriation and deportation of executives seem to 
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be popular with public authorities as a means of “settling” disputes with foreign 
investors.1  
 
In Benvenuti and Bonfant v. Congo 2  the state not only expropriated the 
investor’s 40% share in a joint venture but the Congolese military also occupied 
the investor’s premises and instituted criminal proceedings against Mr Bonfant, 
an officer of the company. In Biloune v. Ghana, 3  despite assurances that 
approval for construction would be forthcoming, the Accra City Council ordered 
the demolition of the project. The principal shareholder of the project, Mr 
Biloune, was arrested and deported. Finally in Desert Line Projects L.L.C. v 
Yemen4 “15 armed individuals demanded payment of invoices and threatene[d] 
the company’s personnel.”5 Days later a member of the local council and 
individuals of his tribe confronted the company’s personnel, “demanding to 
traverse the working site and opening fire with automatic weapons”. 6 
Furthermore, also the manager was urged to leave the country as his life was in 
danger. After an arbitral award in favour of the investor had been rendered three 
of the company’s executives were arrested and detained. 
 
Conversely, it should not be overlooked that investors are not always blameless 
either. In two recent cases Turkey saw itself exposed to arbitration proceedings 
initiated by two Polish companies under the Energy Charter Treaty.7 In both 
cases the claimants alleged termination by Turkish authorities of concession 
agreements granted to two Turkish corporations of which the claimants in each 
case falsely purported to be a shareholder. The assertion of ownership of an 
investment by way of inauthentic documents was regarded by the arbitral tribunal 
 
1 Besides the following description of cases see also Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v. United 
Republic of Tanzania, 24 July 2008, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22. 
2 See S.A.R.L. Benvenuti & Bonfant v. People’s Republic of the Congo, 8 August 1980, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/77/2. 
3 See Biloune and Marine Drive Complex Ltd. v. Ghana Investments Centre and the Government 
of Ghana, 27 October 1989 (Award on Jurisdiction and Liability), International Law Reports 95 
(1994), 184; 30 June 1990 (Award on Damages and Costs), International Law Reports 95 
(1994), 211. 
4 See Desert Line Projects LLC v. Republic of Yemen, 6 February 2008, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/17. 
5 Ibid., at para. 19. 
6 Ibid., at para. 20 
7 See Cementownia “Nowa Huta” S.A. v. Republic of Turkey, 11 May 2007, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/06/2; Europe Cement Investment and Trade S.A. v. Republic of Turkey, 13 September 
2007, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/2. 
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as an “abuse of process” by the claimants. Turkey in turn claimed that its 
reputation among potential investors thus had been severely damaged. 
 
It does not come as a surprise that in all of these cases the aggrieved party sought 
specific compensation for the harm sustained. Indeed the facts under which the 
harm was done are repugnant to anyone’s sense of justice. Consequently, the 
quest for moral damages began. However, the efforts undertaken by parties and 
counsel to obtain arbitral awards for moral damages have remained mostly 
fruitless to date. Out of the cases reported above, only one award – Desert Line 
L.L.C. v Yemen – has in fact granted moral damages to the claimant. In all other 
cases the claim for moral damages was rejected albeit for several different 
reasons.  
3. A PRIVATE LAWYER’S PERSPECTIVE OF THE DEBATE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
3.1. General 
Having a closer look at the discussions in public international law reveals that, at 
this stage, the whole discussion is more or less based upon the notion of loss and 
damage as it was understood by Hugo Grotius8 in his seminal work “The Rights 
of War and Peace” published in the year 1625. It is true that this work remains 
the foundation of public international law, especially regarding the law of war, 
which he developed from a generalisation of his earlier works on admiralty law 
(“law of prize”). 9  However, it seems to be overlooked by many public 
international law authors that Grotius attempted to provide a comprehensive 
account of natural law. An integral part of the whole work thus concerns what 
nowadays would be classified as private law. In Book II of this work Grotius 
covers all areas of private law, namely the law of persons, property law, family 
law, inheritance law, contract law, tort law and even corporations.10 As regards 
the issue of damages Grotius certainly did not invent this concept. In developing 
his ideas he heavily relied on Greek philosophers such as Aristotle and especially 
 
8 Born 10 April 1583, died 28 August 1645. The Rights of War and Peace (De iure belli ac pacis) 
Including the Law of Nature and of Nations, first published in Paris, 1625. This article relies on 
the English translation published by Kessinger Publishing, LLC, Whitefish, 2004. 
9 E. Wolf, Grosse Rechtsdenker der deutschen Geistesgeschichte (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 
1963), 279. 
10 See Book II, Chapters III – XIX. 
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on Roman private law jurists such as Cicero.11 It is therefore unacceptable to 
single out Grotius from the overall development of the law of damages that has 
ensued from before Grotius’ time until well after it.  
 
The reasoning by Grotius concerning the law of damages has been adopted to 
some extent by the United States – Germany Mixed Claims Commission in its 
famous opinion in the Lusitania cases of 1 November 1923.12 This opinion is the 
second main source upon which the debate in public international law is founded 
today. The so called Lusitania cases involved the sinking of the British Ocean 
Liner Lusitania off the coast of Ireland by a German submarine during World 
War I on 17 May 1915, killing a total of 1’198 people amongst which were 128 
US citizens. The German government acknowledged its liability for losses 
already nine months later.13 The main question before the Commission was 
whether death warranted a damage claim in and of itself and how damages are to 
be measured in such a case, especially, whether surviving close persons – in this 
instance their relatives – may ask for recovery of what the deceased would have 
contributed to their future living, as well as for moral damages.  
 
In dealing with these questions the work of Grotius served as merely one 
reference point among others and was cited only once in the opinion. Most 
remarkably, the Commission undertook a thorough comparative analysis of the 
then leading legal systems in the western world, namely American, English, 
French and German law. In doing so, the discussion exclusively circled around 
private law, with the French Code Civil and the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 
on the one hand, and case law as well as statutes from England and the United 
States on the other hand. One might regret that the Commission did not consider 
the Swiss Code of Obligations which at the time had been in force for eleven 
years and which could have contributed substantially to answering the question 
before the Commission as its Article 45(3) explicitly provides for damages to the 
extent that somebody has lost his or her provider.14 Furthermore, the Swiss Code 
of Obligations in its Article 47 explicitly acknowledges that in case of wrongful 
death of a person, surviving close persons have a claim for moral damages. 
Nevertheless, the legal analysis in the Lusitania opinion is fully lege artis and in 
 
11  See Grotius, supra note 8, 146 et seq. 
12  See United Nations Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Volume VII, 32 – 44. 
13  See United States – Germany Mixed Claims Commission, United Nations Reports of 
International Arbitral Awards, Volume VII, 33 per Parker, Umpire. 
14  Unfortunately the corresponding German provision in § 844(2) BGB was also overlooked by the 
Commission. 
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fact displays an impressive scholarly achievement. In the first place, it discusses 
the relevant issues in their proper context, namely private law. Second, the use of 
the comparative method and the extent to which it was applied in those days is 
quite remarkable. 
 
In stark contrast, the more recent works dealing with moral damages in public 
international law have put Grotius out of context and neglected any careful 
comparative analysis of the law of damages that the Commission in the Lusitania 
cases had skilfully undertaken. The most recent and comprehensive work on 
damages in international jurisprudence mostly relies on public international law 
publications.15 To support her solutions merely two private law publications 
were considered; they were published in 1972 and 1986 respectively.16 Except 
for citing one provision from the Austrian Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, 
the (Austrian) author does not mention any domestic approach to the law of 
damages. From the perspective of a private law scholar this is somewhat 
surprising given that the law of damages has been at the very centre of private 
law development for 200 years now and has been at issue in an abundant number 
of court decisions, arbitral awards and scholarly writings dealing with domestic, 
comparative and uniform law. Particularly the last twenty years have witnessed a 
veritable upheaval in the debate on damages. 
 
In addition to the at least doubtful methodology there are fundamental 
misunderstandings of the basic structures of the law of damages and key private 
law concepts. The legal basis for a damages claim including possible exemption 
due to force majeure is often confused with the concept of legally compensable 
loss and its calculation. 17  Likewise, questions of causation and general 
compensability are mixed up with questions of proof.18 Also the relevance of 
 
15  See I. Marboe, Die Berechnung von Entschädigung und Schadensersatz in der internationalen 
Rechtsprechung (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2009), 40 footnote 152. 
16  Hans Stoll, ‘Consequences of Liability: Remedies’, in International Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law, Vol. XI Torts, Chapter 8, ed. A. Tunc (Tübingen et al: J. C. B. Mohr Siebeck 
et al., 1986); G.H. Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract, in International Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law, Vol. VIII Specific Contracts, Chapter 16, ed. W. Lorenz (Tübingen et al: J. 
C. B. Mohr Siebeck et al., 1976). 
17  See I. Marboe, supra note 15, 430-432. 
18  See I. Marboe, supra note 15, 429 relying on Asian Agricultural Products Limited v. 
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, 27 June 1990, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, para. 
104 to support her statement that international arbitral tribunals are reluctant to award 
consequential losses because of their being speculative and uncertain. However, in this case the 
tribunal did not question the general recoverability of lost profit – a consequential loss – but 
refused to award damages for lost profit because it was not sufficiently substantiated. 
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fault for the liability for and the extent of damages, respectively, are often not 
separated and correctly evaluated.19 Moreover, the analysis of concepts which at 
the domestic level as well as in uniform private law have long been clearly 
defined and delimited from one another such as consequential loss, lost profit, 
moral damages and punitive damages is blurred as these terms seem to be used 
interchangeably. Finally, specific types of financial detriment are wrongly 
classified; for example, costs for mitigation of losses and legal costs20 are treated 
as consequential losses.21 
3.2. Developments in Private Law 
Many problems concerning the law of damages currently discussed in public 
international law have been settled for decades – sometimes even centuries – in 
private law. The attention currently paid to the notions of damnum emergens and 
lucrum cessans in public international law piqued in the middle of the nineteenth 
century in private law. Since then, at least in Western legal systems, nobody 
questions the availability of damages for lost profit any more. It was just for 
reasons of clarification that drafters of the 1980 United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)22 felt the need to explicitly 
provide “that damages consist of a sum equal to the loss, including loss of profit” 
in Article 74 sentence 1 CISG.23 This notion also found its way into other 
international instruments such as the Acte Uniforme du Droit Commcerial 
Générale24 enacted by the Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique de 
Droit des Affaires (OHADA) 25 , the 1994/2004 UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts (PICC), the 1999 Principles of European 
 
19  P. Dumberry, Compensation for Moral Damages in Investor-State Arbitration Disputes, Journal 
of International Arbitration 27 (2010): 259 et seq. 
20  Sunday Times v. UK costs follow the event 
21  I. Marboe, supra note 15, 437, 439. 
22  This Convention now has 76 Contracting States covering all legal families and is potentially 
applicable to more than 80% of international sales contracts, see I. Schwenzer & P. Hachem, 
‘The CISG – Successes and Pitfalls’, The American Journal of Comparative Law 57 (2009): 
457. 
23  See I. Schwenzer, in Schlechtriem & Schwenzer – Commentary on the UN Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods 3rd ed., ed. I. Schwenzer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 
Art. 74 para. 3 (hereinafter ‘Commentary’); E.A. Farnsworth, ‘Damages and Specific Relief’, 
The American Journal of Comparative Law 27 (1979): 249. 
24  The Act was drafted in 1998 and has in general followed the model of the CISG, see U.G. 
Schroeter, ‘Das einheitliche Kaufrecht der afrikanischen OHADA-Staaten im Vergleich zum 
UN-Kaufrecht’, Recht in Afrika 4 (2001): 163 et seq. 
25  Founded in 1993 this Organisation to date counts 16 Contracting States. 
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Contract Law (Parts I and II) (PECL) and most recently the 2009 Draft Common 
Frame of Reference prepared by the Study Group for a European Civil Code26 
(DCFR). What is discussed nowadays in private law both at the domestic as well 
as at the international level is whether lost profit should also encompass the loss 
of a chance and how damages for such a loss are to be calculated.27 
 
As far as moral damages are concerned, in private law the respective starting 
points of the different legal systems could hardly be reconciled. Whereas under 
French law the general clause in Article 1382 Code Civil was applied liberally by 
courts for more than a hundred years,28 Germanic legal systems followed a rather 
restrictive approach based on the economic benefits principle.29 However, today 
it is settled amongst legal systems that at least in some instances non-pecuniary 
loss may be recoverable. Consequently, the drafters of the PICC, PECL and 
DCFR encountered no difficulties when including explicit provisions to this 
effect.30 The real issues in this regard today are to precisely circumscribe the 
factual situations in which moral damages for non-pecuniary loss may be 
awarded. It is only in this regard that legal systems disagree, with one group of 
systems employing very narrow and specific descriptions while the others are 
more generous. Furthermore, it may be questionable whether a detriment is of 
pecuniary or non-pecuniary nature. It is this last issue of classification which may 
already solve a great number of problems in this area.31 Nowadays it is generally 
acknowledged that a loss may not be classified as non-pecuniary on the sole 
grounds that it may be difficult to assess its exact amount. 
4. SUBJECT MATTER 
Against this private law background it seems appropriate to identify the real 
subject matters with regard to moral damages in investment arbitration. First of 
 
26  For criticism towards some deviations from the CISG see I. Schwenzer & P. Hachem, ‘Drafting 
new model rules on sales: CFR as an alternative to the CISG?’, European Journal of Law 
Reform 12 (2010), forthcoming. 
27  See I. Schwenzer & P. Hachem, ‘The Scope of the CISG Provisions on Damages’, in Contract 
Damages: Domestic and International Perspectives, ed. D. Saidov & R. Cunnington (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2008), 97 et seq. 
28  This was already pointed out in the opinion on the Lusitania cases, see United States – Germany 
Mixed Claims Commission, United Nations Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Volume 
VII, 36 per Parker, Umpire. 
29  See I. Schwenzer & P. Hachem, supra note 27, 93 et seq. 
30  See Art. 7.4.2(2) PICC; Art 9:501(2)(a) PECL, Art III.-3:701(3) DCFR. 
31  See I. Schwenzer & P. Hachem, supra note 27, 94 et seq.,100. 
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all a closer look at the cases in which moral damages were at stake reveals that 
moral damages are primarily discussed when it comes to infringement of 
personality rights32 – personal injury, wrongful detention, deportation, threats – 
and loss of reputation33. 
4.1. Damages for Infringement of Personality Rights 
In comparative private law it is nowadays clear that not only physical injury to a 
person, but also other infringements may give rise to a claim for damages. This 
encompasses all forms of violence but also wrongful harassment, wrongful 
imprisonment or deportation. 
 
The first question that arises is whether the applicable international law covers 
infringements of personality rights. A closer look at Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(BITs)34 and bi- and multilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)35 reveals that 
the core of all these instruments is the protection of the investor and the 
investment.  
 
However, the scope of the protection varies significantly among BITs. The 
starting point typically is the same three-tier approach.36 Firstly, the investor 
shall be treated no less favourably than nationals of the host-state.37 Second, the 
 
32  Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v. United Republic of Tanzania, 24 July 2008, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/05/22; S.A.R.L. Benvenuti & Bonfant v. People’s Republic of the Congo, 8 August 
1980, ICSID Case No. ARB/77/2; Biloune and Marine Drive Complex Ltd. v. Ghana 
Investments Centre and the Government of Ghana, 27 October 1989 (Award on Jurisdiction and 
Liability), International Law Reports 95 (1994), 184; 30 June 1990 (Award on Damages and 
Costs), International Law Reports 95 (1994), 211; Desert Line Projects LLC v. Republic of 
Yemen, 6 February 2008, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17.  
33  See Cementownia “Nowa Huta” S.A. v. Republic of Turkey, 11 May 2007, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/06/2; Europe Cement Investment and Trade S.A. v. Republic of Turkey, 13 September 
2007, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/2. 
34  M. Dimsey, The Resolution of International Investment Disputes (Utrecht: Eleven International 
Publishing, 2008), 14. 
35  Ibid., at 15. 
36  See in greater detail A. Newcombe & L. Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: 
Standards of Treatment (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2009), 233-298. 
37  See for instance Article 1102 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); Article 3 
Model United States Bilateral Investment Treaty (2004); Article 3(1) United Kingdom and 
Tanzania Bilateral Investment Treaty; Article 3(1) Germany and Argentina Bilateral Investment 
Treaty; Article 3(2) Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic Bilateral 
Investment Treaty; Article 3(1) sentence 1 Mozambique and Uganda Bilateral Investment 
Treaty. 
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investor shall be treated no less favourably than investors from non-party states.38 
In the third step, it is stated that treatment must accord with (customary) 
international law. This is, however, where differences appear. One group of BITs 
requires that such treatment be applied to the investment.39 The other group of 
BITs requires that such treatment be applied to the investor and the investment.40 
As will be seen, this difference is of eminent practical significance.  
(a) Infringements Sustained by the Investor Him- or Herself 
In many instances the actual investor will be a company – a juridical person. In 
these scenarios, infringements on the physical assets of the company will not 
give rise to the issue of moral damages as the harm sustained is indeed purely 
physical and more or less easily measurable.41 Whether moral damages for 
infringements sustained by representatives of that company may be recovered is 
a separate issue and is discussed below.42 For the present purposes which focus 
on the investor in a narrow sense, it is envisaged that the actual investor is a 
natural person who him- or herself sustains infringements of his or her physical 
integrity.  
 
At this stage the scope of the protection offered by the respective BIT to the 
investor is relevant. Clauses in BITs providing that the investor be treated no less 
favourable than investors of the host state or investors from other states typically 
make reference to the acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, 
and sale or other disposition of investments.43 It is then doubtful, whether the 
conduct of a state as described in the cases earlier even amounts to a treaty 
breach. In other words, it is not self-understood that wrongful harassment, 
imprisonment, deportation etc. are in and of itself a treaty breach giving rise to a 
damages claim and thus opening up the way to moral damages. While it is clear 
 
38  See for instance Article 1103 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); Article 4 
Model United States Bilateral Investment Treaty (2004); Article 3(2) United Kingdom and 
Tanzania Bilateral Investment Treaty; Article 3(2) Germany and Argentina Bilateral Investment 
Treaty; Article 3(3) Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic Bilateral 
Investment Treaty; Article 3(1) sentence 2 Mozambique and Uganda Bilateral Investment 
Treaty. 
39  See for instance Article 1105 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); Article 5 
Model United States Bilateral Investment Treaty (2004). 
40  See for instance Article 5 Model Norwegian Bilateral Investment Treaty (2007). 
41  For the treatment of loss of reputation see below sub. 4.2. 
42  See below sub. 4.1.b. 
43  See for instance Articles 3, 4 Model United States Bilateral Investment Treaty. 
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that these acts of the host state prevent the investor from the activities listed in 
the BITs, the damages claim arising is directed only at the recovery of losses in 
the investment caused by these acts. The claim is, however, not directed at 
redressing the infringements of personality rights. 
 
The same question arises with regard to clauses requiring treatment in 
accordance with (customary) international law. In this context the differences 
between the BITs regarding the scope of protection play out strongly. Where 
BITs restrict the protection by (customary) international law to the investment 
itself, the investor will not be able to bring a claim for damages based on the 
infringement of his or her personality rights. Rather, he or she will only be able 
to recover losses in the investment caused by the wrongful acts of the host state. 
Consequently, moral damages are not recoverable in these situations by way of 
treaty arbitration.  
 
Matters are different, where the BIT accords protection by (customary) 
international law also to the investor him- or herself.44 As far as wrongful acts of 
the host state violate (customary) international law, it follows naturally that the 
investor may not only claim damages or compensation for the harm done in 
relation to his or her investment but also in relation to personal injury. How to 
measure damages in this case is a question that must be answered by relying on 
comparative private law. This encompasses also the issue of the recovery of 
moral damages for pain and suffering. The question of whether, in case of death 
of the investor, the surviving close persons are entitled to compensation, be it for 
loss of contribution to their living expenses made by the deceased or for pain and 
suffering for the loss of a loved one, must be answered in the same way. This 
corresponds to the position taken by the Lusitania Commission. From a 
comparative private law point of view there is a clear tendency to allow moral 
damages in these cases45 – a tendency that had already been discerned in the 
Lusitania cases as the result of the comparative overview conducted by the 
Commission46. 
 
 
44  See for instance Article 5 Model Norwegian Bilateral Investment Treaty (2007). 
45  For a comprehensive comparative perspective on Europe see A. Janssen, ‘Das 
Angehörigenschmerzensgeld in Europa und dessen Entwicklung – Verpasst Deutschland den 
Anschluss’, Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik (2003): 157. 
46  United States – Germany Mixed Claims Commission, United Nations Reports of International 
Arbitral Awards, Volume VII, 41 et seq. per Parker, Umpire. 
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It is a different question whether such claims for personal injury can be brought 
in specific arbitral proceedings. The ICSID Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States in its Article 
25(1) explicitly circumscribes the jurisdiction of the Centre. Under this rule “any 
legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State 
[…] and a national of another Contracting State” (emphasis added) falls within 
the scope of the jurisdiction of the Centre. The crucial question thus is whether 
the personal injury of the investor him- or herself leads to a dispute that arises 
“directly” out of an investment.  
 
The term “investment” itself is not defined by the ICSID Convention. Rather, it 
is the individual BIT that must be consulted in the first place.47 Once it is 
established that there is an investment and the claimant qualifies as an investor, it 
must be determined, whether the infringement of the investor’s personality rights 
is directly related to the investment. This must be decided on the facts of the 
individual case. The factual situations in the cases described earlier – deportation, 
harassment, wrongful imprisonment – would certainly constitute the necessary 
direct relationship if the investor him- or herself had been exposed to such 
actions by the State.  
 
The situation may be different if the investor chooses to rely not on investment 
treaty arbitration, but on commercial arbitration arising out of the separate project 
agreement with the State. The question whether a claim for infringement of 
personality rights may be adjudicated in this commercial arbitration entirely 
depends upon the wording of the arbitration clause contained in the project 
agreement. This was exactly the case and pivotal point in Biloune v. Ghana.48 In 
this case the arbitration clause read as follows 
Where any dispute arises between the foreign investor and the Government 
in respect of the enterprise, […] [a]ny dispute […] in respect of an approved 
enterprise […] may be submitted to arbitration; in accordance with the rules 
of procedure for arbitration of [UNCITRAL]. (emphasis added).  
 
47  See M. Dimsey, supra note 34, 47 et seq. 
48  Biloune and Marine Drive Complex Ltd. v. Ghana Investments Centre and the Government of 
Ghana, 27 October 1989 (Award on Jurisdiction and Liability), International Law Reports 95 
(1994), 184; 30 June 1990 (Award on Damages and Costs), International Law Reports 95 
(1994), 211. 
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The tribunal in this case rightly held that the arbitration clause did not cover 
infringement of personality rights sustained by the investor:49 
Long-established customary international law requires that a State accord 
foreign nationals within its territory a standard of treatment no less than 
prescribed by international law. Moreover, […] all individuals […] are 
entitled to fundamental human rights […] which no government may 
violate. Nevertheless, it does not follow that this Tribunal is competent to 
pass upon every type of departure from the minimum standard to which 
foreign nationals are entitled, or that this Tribunal is authorized to deal with 
allegations of violations of fundamental human rights. […] the government 
agreed to arbitrate only disputes “in respect of” the foreign investment. Thus 
other matters – however compelling the claim or wrongful the alleged act – 
are outside this Tribunal’s jurisdiction. 
(b) Infringements Sustained by the Representatives of the Investor 
In most instances the investor is a company.50 In the typical scenario giving rise 
to the discussion of moral damages in investment arbitration, the representatives 
of that company sustain infringements of their personality rights. It has already 
been pointed out earlier that the scope of the protection of the investor him- or 
herself is defined differently under BITs.51 Obviously, where the investor cannot 
successfully seek moral damages, the representative is also prevented from doing 
so.  
 
However, personality rights infringements sustained by the representatives of the 
investor may be the subject of treaty arbitration, if this infringement at the same 
time affects the investment itself. For example, if an employee is detained and 
cannot carry out his or her work, this will affect the investment as, for example, 
the returns of the company will be decreased. The investor then, however, does 
not assert the rights of its representatives but asserts its own rights under the 
investment treaty. The investor can then not claim moral damages for the harm 
 
49  Biloune and Marine Drive Complex Ltd. v. Ghana Investments Centre and the Government of 
Ghana, 27 October 1989 (Award on Jurisdiction and Liability), International Law Reports 95 
(1994), 202 et seq.  
50  See C.H. Schreuer, in The ICSID Convention – A Commentary 2nd ed., ed. C.H. Schreuer 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), Art. 25 para. 640. But see also the references 
provided there for thirty cases involving natural persons as investors. 
51  See above sub. 4.1.a. 
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sustained by the representatives but must substantiate its own loss in the 
investment. 
 
Where a BIT or FTA specifically envisages the protection of the investor52 and 
not only of the investment, the question arises, whether the representative of the 
investor is also encompassed by the notion of “investor” and thus also protected 
by the respective BIT or FTA. In other words, it is necessary to determine, 
whether the representative of an investor can take action against the infringement 
of its own personality rights by way of treaty arbitration. It should be noted that 
this question is different from the question whether the representative has 
sufficient authority conferred upon him or her to bring the claims of the investor 
before an ICSID-Tribunal. 
 
The definition for “investor” typically offered in BITs does not indicate that 
representatives are investors.53 Therefore, these treaties must be understood to 
not protect the personality rights of natural persons who are not investors. The 
result is that if the representative of an investing company sustains infringements 
of his or her personality rights, he or she him- or herself cannot bring an action 
directed at the recovery of his or her own losses against the State relying on 
breach of a BIT. They can not resort to treaty arbitration, but instead have to 
claim their own (moral) damages in separate proceedings.54 
 
On this footing, the award rendered in the Desert Line case is only partly 
convincing. In this case the executives of the investor had been exposed to 
physical duress. The investor sought moral damages and was awarded USD 1 
Million. The arbitral tribunal in this case found the infringements of the 
executives’ personality rights to be a breach of the BIT. It awarded moral 
damages to the investor on the grounds that the “prejudice was substantial since 
it affected the physical health of the Claimant’s executives and the Claimant’s 
credit and reputation.”55 The result that the Claimant was awarded (moral) 
 
52  See above sub. 4.1.a. 
53  See for instance Article 1 Model United States Bilateral Investment Treaty (2004); Article 3(1) 
Germany and Argentina Bilateral Investment Treaty; Article 1(2) Peru and China Bilateral 
Investment Treaty; Article 1(b) Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 
Bilateral Investment Treaty; Article 1(4) Mozambique and Uganda Bilateral Investment Treaty; 
Article 1(3) Bulgaria and Cyprus Bilateral Investment Treaty. 
54  Against P. Dumberry, supra note 19, 266 who concedes that this position is correct as a matter 
of law but finds it to be undesirable and thus opts for the contrary approach. 
55  See Desert Line Projects LLC v. Republic of Yemen, 6 February 2008, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/17, at para. 290. 
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damages for loss of its own reputation deserves support; although it could be 
argued that the concept of moral damages is not needed in these situations but 
rather that the general law of damages covers these instances.56  However, 
awarding moral damages to the Claimant for the infringement of the personality 
rights of the Claimant’s executives is not convincing. Either, they are considered 
to be investors in which case they would have to receive the damages awarded. 
Or they are not considered investors but then the moral damages could only be 
awarded to the Claimant on the grounds that the investment itself was affected. 
 
Where the conduct of the State or in other instances of the investor57 is repugnant 
to anyone’s sense of justice, this in and of itself does not lead to moral damages. 
From a comparative private law view such conduct may, however, be influential 
on the outcome of the case. Nowadays it is increasingly advocated in private law 
both at the domestic and the international level that the specific behaviour of the 
obligor may be taken into consideration when it comes to the calculation of the 
loss and the ensuing damages claim.58 This is especially true as far as the 
standard of proof is concerned. In many instances the investor may face 
difficulties in proving the exact loss caused to the investment by the infringement 
of the employee’s personal rights. The standard of proof should then be lowered 
if the conduct of the State can be labelled as outrageous or otherwise reckless. 
4.2. Loss of Reputation 
Apart from the situations discussed in the previous section on infringement of 
personal rights, moral damages in the context of investment arbitration are 
mostly discussed in connection with loss of reputation. It seems that in the 
current discussion in public international law, loss of reputation is commonly 
deemed to be a non-pecuniary loss that could only be redressed by way of moral 
damages. Two broad groups of cases must be distinguished. The first is the loss 
of reputation as a typical consequential loss suffered by the investor upon a treaty 
breach by the host State. The second is where the State’s reputation is harmed by 
malicious prosecution initiated by the (purported) investor. 
 
56  See below sub. 4.2. 
57 See for such constellations See Cementownia “Nowa Huta” S.A. v. Republic of Turkey, 11 May 
2007, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/06/2; Europe Cement Investment and Trade S.A. v. Republic of 
Turkey, 13 September 2007, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/2.  
58  See I. Schwenzer, Commentary, supra note 23, Art. 74 para. 65; I. Schwenzer & P. Hachem, 
supra note 27, 103. In a similar vein, the uniform projects also take into account the conduct of 
a party breaching the contract when determining the fundamentality of the breach, see Art. 
7.3.1(2)(c) PICC; Art. 8:103(c) PECL; Art. III. – 3:502(2)(c) DCFR. 
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(a) Loss of Reputation by Investor 
The current debate concerning the loss of reputation by the investor suffers from 
basic misunderstandings of the notions of loss of reputation and loss of profit 
which in private law are clearly distinguished and well elaborated.  
 
The notion of loss of profit covers every potential increase in assets which was 
prevented by the breach.59 Loss of profit may be actual and readily proven such 
as contracts already entered into or it may lie in the future. Admittedly, future 
loss of profit may be hard to quantify. This is probably the reason why it is 
sometimes labelled as speculative in public international law.60 This, however, 
does not justify encompassing loss of profit under the heading of moral damages. 
Rather, this is nothing more than a question of proof.61 
 
As concerns the loss of reputation, again, a closer look at the developments in 
comparative private law may shed valuable light on this issue. It is nowadays 
unanimously held at the international level – especially in light of the general 
principle of full compensation – that loss of reputation is compensable. 62 
Reputation certainly has an economic value. This is evidenced by the fact that the 
purchase price for a company typically not only reflects the physical assets of the 
company, but also the goodwill attached to it. Furthermore, huge amounts of 
money are spent by companies to build up a respectable reputation in the market 
or to re-establish their reputation in the market after it has been damaged. This 
economic value of reputation necessarily leads to the conclusion that loss of 
reputation is a pecuniary, not a non-pecuniary loss. The financial consequences 
of damage to reputation may be difficult to ascertain. For example, it will be 
difficult for a claimant to establish which contracts with new customers were 
never concluded because of the damaged reputation. But this does not warrant 
categorising the ensuing loss as non-pecuniary. Again, the central issue is the 
standard of proof to be applied. This may well be influenced by the nature of the 
breach and the behaviour by the State in breach of the investment treaty. 
 
 
59  I. Schwenzer, Commentary, supra note 23, Art 74 para 36. 
60  See I. Marboe, supra note 15, 429. 
61  Correctly dealt with therefore by Asian Agricultural Products Limited v. Democratic Socialist 
Republic of Sri Lanka, 27 June 1990, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, para. 104. 
62  See instead of all I. Schwenzer, Commentary, supra note 23, Art 74 para 36, citing numerous 
references. 
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Beyond the truly pecuniary nature of loss of reputation there may be exceptional 
cases in which there remains a non-pecuniary harm. This concerns situations 
where the investor is a natural person and suffers special stress or other mental 
anxieties from the damage to his or her reputation. These instances show a 
striking similarity to those discussed in the context of the infringement of 
personal rights sustained by the investor. In such exceptional cases, moral 
damages may be awarded. 
(b) Loss of Reputation by State 
As has been described above the reputation of a State may be damaged by 
wrongfully initiated investment treaty arbitration against the State.63 Such harm 
to reputation may have quite severe financial consequences for the entire 
economy of the State concerned. It is clear that in most instances consequences 
flowing from any malicious prosecution of the State by the investor are not 
covered by the respective investment treaties. These solely aim at protecting the 
investor against the host State but not the host against its “guest”. This also 
appears to have been the crucial argument for the arbitral tribunal in 
Cementownia v. Turkey.64  
 
Nevertheless, States have a vital interest to immediately assert their 
counterclaims to the malicious claims brought by the other party. This coincides 
with the practical need of facilitating a fast resolution of the issue. Although such 
claims by the State are not treaty claims, investment arbitral tribunals under 
ICSID would still have the possibility to hear such a claim under Article 46 of 
the ICSID-Convention. 
 
Again, the discussion in this area could immensely benefit from a private law 
perspective. In private law all jurisdictions have abundantly discussed liability 
for malicious prosecution both as regards the basis for liability as well as the 
 
63  See See Cementownia “Nowa Huta” S.A. v. Republic of Turkey, 11 May 2007, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/06/2; Europe Cement Investment and Trade S.A. v. Republic of Turkey, 13 September 
2007, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/2. 
64  Cementownia “Nowa Huta” S.A. v. Republic of Turkey, 11 May 2007, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/06/2. para. 169; Europe Cement Investment and Trade S.A. v. Republic of Turkey, 13 
September 2007, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/2. It should be noted that both tribunals spoke 
of abuse of process. However, in Anglo-American tort law the abuse of process and malicious 
prosecution are wholly distinct concepts, see § 652 and § 682 Restatement 2nd Torts. W.L. 
Prosser & R.E. Keeton, Torts 5th ed. (Farmington Hills, Michigan: Gale Cengage, 1984), § 121, 
p. 897 et seq. Restatement 3rd Torts. 
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possible consequences, especially which losses are compensable.65 In particular, 
there is a sufficient body of case law and scholarly writings at the domestic level 
discussing the relevance of the allocation of costs. In legal systems that follow 
the so-called American Rule66 the question arises whether attorneys’ fees not 
compensated under the applicable procedural law can be claimed as damages. In 
systems applying the costs-follow-the-event approach, the question arises 
whether, beyond the allocation of legal costs and attorneys’ fees to the losing 
party, additional damages can be recovered. 
 
The question which substantive law decides whether and what losses are 
recoverable for malicious prosecution must be determined by the applicable 
arbitration rules. According to Article 42(1) sentence 1 ICSID Convention as 
well as Article 35(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010 the tribunal shall 
first of all apply the rules of law designated by the parties as applicable to the 
substance of the dispute. Failing such designation by the parties the tribunal shall 
determine the applicable law either by voie directe (Article 35(1) sentence 2 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010) or by voie indirecte (Article 42(1) sentence 
2 ICSID Convention). In principle the law thus designated determines the legal 
prerequisites and consequences of the investor’s liability towards the State. The 
arbitral tribunal is, however, not precluded from adapting domestic principles to 
international situations by way of comparative analysis. This is a very well 
established principle underlying all international instruments.67 
 
As a result, whether a State may claim compensation for malicious prosecution 
by the investor and whether compensation can take the form of moral damages or 
whether an explicit statement by the tribunal in its award condemning the 
conduct of the investor is sufficient to satisfy the interest of the state is not a 
matter of public international law but a genuine substantive private law issue. 
 
65  See for England Savile v Roberts (1699) 1 Lord Raymond 374 reported in 91 E.R. 1147; E. 
Descheemaeker, ‘Protecting Reputation: Defamation and Negligence’, Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 29 (2009): 603 et seq.; Germany Bundesverfassungsgericht, 25 February 1987, Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift 40 (1987): 1929; J. Oechsler, in Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen 
Gesetzbuch 13th ed., ed. J. von Staudinger (Berlin: Sellier/de Gruyter, 2009), § 826, para. 545 et 
seq; for the U.S.A. see § 652 Restatement 2nd Torts.  
66  In the U.S.A. the parties generally bear their own expenses in litigation, in particular attorneys’ 
fees, see J. Y. Gotanda, ‘Awarding Costs and Attorneys’ Fees in International Commercial 
Arbitrations’, Michigan Journal of International Law 21 (1999): 9 et seq. 
67  See I. Schwenzer & P. Hachem, Commentary, supra note 23, Art 7 para 6 citing references. 
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4.3. Punitive Damages 
Another issue typically raised in public international law in connection with 
moral damages is the concept of punitive damages. Again, the debate is impeded 
by the lack of clear delimitations of the scope of the respective concepts.  
 
In private law a clear distinction is drawn between moral damages on the one 
hand and punitive damages on the other. Whereas moral damages are awarded to 
compensate for non-pecuniary loss, punitive damages envisage primarily 
deterrence of similar conduct in the future.68 The mere fact that the decisions in 
which punitive damages were awarded, at times, also had to deal with non-
pecuniary loss must not lead to a confusion of both concepts. Legal systems 
differ concerning the question whether punitive damages may be awarded, with 
Common Law jurisdictions typically69 answering this question in the affirmative 
and Civil Law systems still being more or less reluctant70. Some of the private 
law international instruments, although not explicitly mentioning punitive 
damages, at least recognise a variation of punitive damages in the form of the 
astreinte rooted in French law.71  
 
The distinction of moral damages on the one hand and punitive damages on the 
other must also be observed in investment arbitration. However, whether punitive 
damages may be awarded to an investor cannot be answered in a general manner. 
 
Although some authors seek to rely on the Lusitania case to advocate a general 
exclusion of punitive damages in international investment arbitration, a closer 
look at the opinion rendered by the Commission reveals that such a broad 
 
68  See for England Wilkes v. Wood [1763] 98 E.R. 489, 498 et seq. per L.C.J. Pratt:  
Damages are designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a 
punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such proceeding for the future and as a proof 
of the detestation of the jury to the action itself.  
For the U.S.A. see Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., U. S. Sup. Ct., 14 
March 2003, 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2003); BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, U. S. Sup. Ct., 20 
May 1996, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (2003). 
69  In some States in the U.S. punitive damages are not available. This is the situation in 
Connecticut, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New Hampshire, see S.L. 
Chanenson & J.Y. Gotanda, ‘The Foggy Road for Evaluating Punitive Damages’, University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform 37 (2004): 446. 
70  See P. Hachem, ‘Prävention und Punitive Damages’, in Prävention im Recht, ed. Wolf & Mona 
& Hürzeler (Basel: Helbing Lichtenhahn Verlag, 2008), 197 et seq. 
71  See Art 7.2.4 PICC 
I. Schwenzer & P. Hachem: Moral Damages in International Investment Arbitration 
429 
statement cannot be deducted from this case. In the Lusitania case the motion for 
punitive damages was dismissed on the sole grounds that the legal basis on which 
the Commission (!) was founded – namely the Berlin Treaty72 – barred the 
Commission from making such an award.73 In contrast to the Versailles Treaty, 
the Berlin Treaty did not incorporate provisions on penalties imposed on 
Germany but instead aimed at restoring friendly relations between the US and 
Germany.74 The Commission did not go “to the length of holding that exemplary 
damages can not be awarded in any case by any international arbitral tribunal”75 
but contented itself with pointing out the reason why this Commission was not 
allowed to do so.76 The Lusitania case therefore is weak authority for the 
position that arbitral tribunals may not award punitive damages in any 
international dispute. 
 
Rather, whether the tribunal is vested with the authority to award punitive 
damages depends on the applicable investment treaty. Some BITs explicitly rule 
out the possibility of punitive damages.77 Under other investment treaties that do 
not contain any statement on punitive damages, the tribunal has to solve this 
issue by interpretation of the respective investment treaty. Thereby special 
consideration is to be given to the domestic approaches to punitive damages 
taken by the respective Contracting States. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The issue of moral damages in international investment arbitration has not 
proven to be a novel one. It has been shown that all aspects in the current debate 
in public international law can be sufficiently handled by clear delimitations of 
concepts relying on centuries of development of the law of damages in private 
 
72  See United Nations Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Volume VII, 9 – 14. The United 
States of America had not ratified the Versailles Treaty which led to the Berlin Treaty. Describe, 
also relation to Versailles. 
73  See United States – Germany Mixed Claims Commission, United Nations Reports of 
International Arbitral Awards, Volume VII, 41 et seq. per Parker, Umpire. 
74  See United States – Germany Mixed Claims Commission, United Nations Reports of 
International Arbitral Awards, Volume VII, 42 per Parker, Umpire. 
75  See United States – Germany Mixed Claims Commission, United Nations Reports of 
International Arbitral Awards, Volume VII, 41 per Parker, Umpire. 
76  See United States – Germany Mixed Claims Commission, United Nations Reports of 
International Arbitral Awards, Volume VII, 42 per Parker, Umpire. 
77  See for instance Article 34(3) Model United States Bilateral Investment Treaty (2004). 
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law. In particular, it does not seem to be necessary to develop a distinct public 
international law of damages. 
 
The core task for public international law which cannot be tackled by private law 
is to clearly define the duties under investment treaties and customary 
international law, which is often referred to as additionally applicable law in 
investment treaties and arbitration rules such as Article 42(1) sentence 2 in fine 
ICSID Convention. At the point where such duties have been developed and 
defined, it must be discussed whether commercial arbitration and investment 
arbitration indeed differ to such an extent that the consequences of a breach of 
duty in the form of damages should be the same in investment arbitration as in 
commercial arbitration, or whether a distinct perception is required. These 
discussions are yet to be embarked on. 
